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Experiences with Teaching Nuclear Security 
















Health physicists are professionals who recognize, evaluate, and control health hazards—an expertise that 
permits the safe use and application of radiation. These professionals typically have broad knowledge in 
radiation (ionizing and non-ionizing), biology, ecology, and safety. We believe that health physicists, 
possessing this wealth of expertise, make useful partners in an effective security culture. Accordingly, we 
have offered to health physics and radiation protection professionals, during the past three years, seven 
professional enrichment courses, both nationally and internationally. Five have been through the Health 
Physics Society meetings, one was through the International Radiation Protection Association meeting, 
and one was held at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This paper will briefly introduce these 
courses and will include learning objectives and descriptions of courses’ content. Although the 
documented feedback from participants was limited, since only 1 of the 7 courses used formal written 
course evaluations, both written and verbal feedback (and other forms of written feedback) to the 
instructors made it clear that the courses were well received. 
I. Introduction 
The objective of this paper is to present activities in delivering nuclear security professional development 
courses with the intent to help fulfill an international need for global training and education in nuclear 
security.  Based upon the special training and knowledge health physicists possess regarding nuclear and 
radiological material, the authors determined that the health physicist would be the ideal target audience 
for awareness and professional training.  To fill this perceived gap in nuclear security awareness for this 
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group, we created professional development, awareness, and enrichment courses to be taught to health 
physics / radiation protection professionals and students alike. 
 
In a recent paper published in the Health Physics Journal, Waller and van Maanen discuss the advantages 
that health physicists would have in a nation’s overall nuclear security program. They explain how health 
physicists can contribute expertise in the roles of establishing the threat assessment and design basis 
threat, informed risk management, response force strategies in light of potential radiation exposure, dose 
guidance, training and demonstrable competence for the nuclear security response force, and with 
effective communications of the radiological component of an event [1]. However, although health 
physicists have long been associated with the safety infrastructure at nuclear facilities, it is not common 
for them, currently, to play a significant role in nuclear security activities.  Although some of this lack of 
participation has been due, in the past, to existing management barriers separating safety and security 
functions, much of the lack of involvement is due to lack of awareness and/or training of the health 
physicists in nuclear security issues (and correspondingly the lack of health physics awareness training 
with the nuclear security personnel). 
 
Whatever has been the degree of their connection with nuclear security in the past, experts in health 
physics, with their broad experience in physics, biology, and environment—and their large and 
prestigious professional organizations—can be important partners in nuclear security. Health physics, or 
the physics of radiation protection, is the science concerned with the recognition, evaluation, and control 
of health hazards to permit the safe use and application of radiation [2]. Health physics professionals 
promote excellence in the science and practice of radiation protection and safety. These professionals 
principally work at facilities where radionuclides or ionizing radiation are used or produced, including 
medical institutions, government laboratories, academic and research institutions, nuclear power plants, 
regulatory agencies, and industrial manufacturing plants. Nonionizing radiation sources such as lasers, 
microwaves, and radiofrequency (RF) radiation may also fall under the control of a health physicist. 
Within the US, the Health Physics Society (HPS) is the primary organization that supports its members in 
the practice of their profession and promotes excellence in the science and practice of radiation safety. 
The HPS has a membership of nearly 5,000 and holds two major conferences each year. Worldwide, there 
are over 15,000 individuals holding the title of health physicist or radiation protection professional. 
 
Some efforts have been made within the last decade to move towards a more informed approach to 
nuclear security for all facility personnel.  The Nuclear Security Summits, starting in 2010, provided an 
impetus for increased growth in the areas of nuclear security training and education.  In 2010, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency published a Nuclear Security series document outlining an 
educational program in nuclear security, at both the certificate and master degree level [3]. The same 
year, the IAEA International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) was established with a 
mission to enhance global nuclear security by developing, sharing, and promoting excellence in nuclear 
security education [4].  Also, in the same year, the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) was 
incorporated as an International Non-Governmental Organisation (INGO) with a mission to lead in 
professional development and certification for nuclear security management [5]. 
 
Professional enrichment course offerings for societies, such as the HPS in the US, have a competitive 
selection process in which proponents of a topical course must submit an abstract and proposed duration 
of the training. The American Board of Health Physics (ABHP) assesses continuing education credits 
(CEC) for the courses, dependent upon the training duration.  This is an important concept, as persons 
holding the ABHP certification entitled Certified Health Physicist (CHP) require a certain number of 
credits per certification cycle (5 years) in order to retain the certification.  Other bodies offering 
certification credentials, such as the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) Certified Nuclear 
Security Professional (CNSP), have similar requirements for certification maintenance. For the offerings 
of professional enrichment program courses at HPS meetings, the ABHP assignment is generally 4 CEC 
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per 2-hour course. The ABHP requires 80 CEC be obtained over a 5-year recertification cycle (and it is 
worthy to note that there are other ways to obtain CEC aside from course attendance). 
 
Health physicists are a motivated group for professional development, and courses in nuclear security that 
cover both nuclear and radiological material management are desirable.  The scope of this paper 
encompasses a discussion of the authors’ recent offerings in professional development for nuclear 
security.  We have structured the paper to outline the details of specific courses, share a model syllabus 
for a professional development course in nuclear security, consider the materials used in the courses, and 
discuss the results obtained—with reference to limited participant feedback. 
II. Professional Enrichment Course Offerings 
During the past three years, the authors have offered seven professional enrichment courses to health 
physics and radiation protection professionals, both nationally and internationally.  Five have been 
through the Health Physics Society (HPS) meetings, one through the International Radiation Protection 
Association (IRPA) meeting, and one at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).  Not included 
in this list are the dozens of presentations we have given on nuclear security at meetings and conferences 
throughout the world. 
 
In the Appendix of this article, we present a mapping of lectures against specific course offerings in 
nuclear security.  The modules (see appendix) taught for any given course reflect the time available and 
the approved course proposals to the venue organizers. 
A. Syllabus 
Although the syllabi are slightly different for each offering depending upon the exact content and context 
as given above, we present below a model syllabus consisting of an abstract and an 8-hour lesson plan. 
Here is a typical abstract for our course entitled Nuclear Security for Health Physicists: 
 
Health physics is an essential function in most nuclear facilities and the primary responsibility is a safety 
function.  Nuclear security is, however, extremely important for all nuclear facilities, especially after the 
September 2001 attacks on the USA.  The role of the health physicist in nuclear security matters is not 
clearly defined despite the fact that a fundamental understanding of radiological hazards of adversary 
target material is required for understanding the total risk to the facility and/or material. Health physics 
can be integrated into nuclear security during design basis threat definition, through risk management 
exercises, participation in response force activities, developing dose guidance criteria, radiological 
training and in communicating hazard and risk to security personnel, facility operators and regulatory 
bodies. When integrating health physics into nuclear security, it is important that health physics 
management or the responsible/senior health physicist establish dialogue early with nuclear security 
personnel in generating the design basis threat. The dialogue must include the advantages of considering 
radiological hazard as part of the comprehensive response plan. Health physicists are multi-capable 
scientists, engineers and systems integrators that can contribute greatly at multiple levels for effective and 
efficient nuclear security. To be an effective partner in the nuclear security objective, health physicists 
must embrace the nuclear security culture. As such, this course serves as an introduction to the basic 
elements of nuclear security, with specific emphasis on prevention, detection, and response. The 
following key elements will be covered in the course: 
 
1. Prevention consists of all such security measures that may serve as deterrence or that prevent an 
unauthorized access to a protected nuclear facility or nuclear material. These preventive security 
measures could be adopted or implemented at facility level or at State level. 
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2. Detection consists of all techniques that may help in detection of an unauthorized access by 
someone to a protected nuclear facility or nuclear material. These detections measures could be 
implemented at facility level or at State level. 
3. Response is used to defeat an adversary by preventing it from accomplishing its tasks either by 
containment or neutralization. These response measures can also be implemented at facility level 
and at State level. 
 
Two very important areas of nuclear security are discussed in detail: (i) physical protection system (PPS), 
and (ii) IT/Cybersecurity. Physical Protection can be defined as ensuring the detection, delay and 
response to the malicious acts against nuclear materials and nuclear facilities through an integrated system 
of people, technology and procedures. Physical protection systems discussion will include concepts, 
approaches, design and evaluation methodologies for physical protection delay (i.e. barriers), detection 
(i.e. sensors) and response (i.e. guards). IT/Cybersecurity will be discussed in terms of IT security 
domains for nuclear operations, and hardware (instrumentation & control) implications. The STUXNET 
virus will be generally discussed to demonstrate threats to I&C systems that may be part of nuclear 
operations. 
 
At the end of this course, the participant should have a high-level overview of nuclear security, and be 
able to formulate possible roles of the health physicist in security functions. 
 









1 0800 0815 Instructor introductions and outline of the course 
2 0815 0915 Introduction to nuclear security 
3 0915 1000 Design Basis Threat (DBT) 
- 1000 1015 Break 
4 1015 1045 Safety, Security and Safeguards 
5 1045 1130 Terrorist threat, non-state actors, RDD/IND/NW 
6 1130 1200 Consequence management 
- 1200 1300 Lunch 
7 1300 1400 Facility, Border and Source Security 
- 1400 1430 Exercise – detection 
8 1430 1500 Physical Protection Systems I 
- 1500 1515 Break 
9 1515 1600 Physical Protection Systems II 
10 1600 1645 IT/Cybersecurity 
- 1645 1700 Wrap-up 
 
It is impossible to teach all the elements of nuclear security in 8 hours, and as a professional enrichment 
course is reduced to 4 or 2 hours, the material becomes increasingly more like awareness material. But 
given 8 hours, there is time to conduct some limited exercises with the course participants in an 
interactive fashion, whereas in 2-4 hours instruction is more didactic. In any case, for the purpose of the 
health physicist gaining knowledge and basic understanding of nuclear security issues, the length of the 
course is secondary to the goal of familiarizing learners with this material. 
 
Although we made available the primary teaching materials (generally speaking, lecture slides) prior to 
the courses, we also prepared and distributed USB sticks with both native application (Microsoft 
Powerpoint) and PDF versions of the materials, as well as other related materials that may have been 
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referenced in the training—for example case studies, IAEA or other documents for supplemental reading, 
and freely available software tools (i.e. customized spreadsheets).  This added-value material was 
designed to maximize the possibility that learners would continue to investigate and be aware of nuclear 
security issues that may be related to their jobs. 
B. Materials 
The resources used for the training were primarily sourced from INSEN educational materials and from a 
variety of teaching materials the individual instructors have developed as part of their own teaching 
duties.  INSEN members have access to a large repository of teaching materials, hosted on an internal 
IAEA website.  The materials are arranged according to the courses outlined in IAEA Nuclear Security 
Series Publication 12 [3], and include lecture slides, course notes, instructor notes, scenarios, and tabletop 
exercises. 
 
Specifically, INSEN members have developed a number of materials that were used as part of the courses 
delivered by the authors. Textbooks and/or manuscripts that have been completed include: NS-8 (Physical 
Protection Technologies and Equipment), NS-9 (Security of Nuclear and other Radioactive Material in 
Transport), and NS-22 (IT/Cyber Security) [6]. 
 
Along with the textbooks, portions of the following modules from NS 1 (Introduction to Nuclear 
Security) were used in the course content: NS 1.3 (Interrelationships between safety, security, and 
safeguards), NS 1.4 (Nuclear threat by non-state actors), NS 1.6 (CBRN weapons), NS 1.7 (Basic 
elements of nuclear security), NS 1.8 (Planning nuclear security at the State level), NS 1.9 (Planning 
nuclear security at the nuclear/radiological facility), NS 1.10 (Introduction to detection of, and response 
to, criminal or unauthorized acts involving nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory 
control), NS 1.11 (Information Security), and NS 1.12 (Security culture: Concept and Model). 
III. Results 
The HPS has standard course evaluation forms, which we distribute to course participants.  However, 
completion of the form is voluntary, and as is often the case, course evaluation and feedback tends to 
suffer from low participation (therefore poor statistics) and weak inferences. The most useful feedback is 
often obtained by talking with participants after the training; however, this is unscientific and may suffer 
from bias (selective presentation of feedback). 
 
The most complete feedback was received from the three courses offered during the 60th Annual Meeting 
of the Health Physics Society in 2015. For each course, the percentage of completed evaluations was 
greater than 60%.  Combining the responses from all three courses, a total of 46 responses were tabulated.  
The overall course ratings were as follows: 59% (27 respondents) rated the course as “Excellent,” 28% 
(13 respondents) rated the course as “Very Good,” 9% (4 respondents) rated the course as “Good,” and 
4% (2 respondents) rated the course as “Fair” or “Poor.” 
 
The other offerings at IRPA and at MIT did not have evaluation forms and therefore no documented 
feedback was available. 
 
A consistent message that was relayed to instructors very early was that the course participants were very 
pleased that a course in nuclear security was being offered to them in the context of health physics. We 
perceived this had as much to do with a general interest in the subject material as it did with the 
introduction of a new topic to the continuing education training cohort.  One might infer that there is, 
therefore, a general desire for health physicists to increase their awareness about nuclear security and 
determine where they may actively participate. We determined that this was a very good indication 
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because it demonstrated a willingness of health physicists to broaden their horizons and look beyond a 
“safety silo.” 
IV. Conclusion 
Health physicists, with their diverse experience in radiological sciences, can play vital roles in nuclear 
security. Reaching out to this community of professionals, the authors have presented seven enrichment 
courses at both national and international meetings of professional societies. These courses focused on 
giving health physicists a greater insight into the many challenging areas of nuclear security and how they 
might cooperate with other professionals working in nuclear security. This paper has described the 
courses, their objectives, and how they were delivered. Although there was limited documented proof of 
the success of these courses, we have various indications that the courses were well received by attendees. 
We must more actively distribute and collect course evaluations, and we recommend this to anyone 
teaching such courses. It may also be useful to reach out to past participants of courses in order to collect 
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